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URING the Survey period, the courts in Texas continued to ad-
dress the challenging substantive and procedural issues posed by
toxic tort and mass tort litigation. Although the courts, for the
most part, broke no new ground, they continued to follow trends-such
as the cabining of the duty owed by manufacturers, premises owners, and
contractors to consumers and workers, strict scrutiny of scientific proof in
toxic tort cases, and restriction of the use of the class action device in
mass tort cases-observed in previous Surveys of this area of the law.
Judicial developments, however, were largely overshadowed by the Texas
Legislature's consideration and enactment of the comprehensive package
of tort reform legislation known as House Bill 4.
I. LEGISLATION: HOUSE BILL 4
In enacting House Bill 4, the legislature adopted numerous controver-
sial changes to both the substantive law and the procedural rules that
typically govern toxic and mass tort cases. Some of the provisions con-
tained in the bill, such as the class action statutes, the statutes creating
procedures for multidistrict administration of multiple related cases, and
the statute limiting a successor corporation's liability for asbestos-related
injuries under certain circumstances, expressly and directly address toxic
or mass tort litigation. Other provisions, like the amendments concerning
proportionate liability, retailer liability, and punitive damages, will gener-
ally be applicable in personal injury litigation, but they will also have a
significant impact on the administration of toxic and mass tort cases. The
following summary is not a comprehensive description of House Bill 4,
but is intended as a guide to the provisions that will most directly affect
toxic and mass tort litigation in this state.
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The legislature significantly impacted class action practice by directing
the Texas Supreme Court to adopt rules limiting the attorney's fees avail-
able to plaintiff's counsel in class action cases and by expanding access to
supreme court review of class certification orders. New Sections 26.001
through 26.003 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code direct the
supreme court to adopt rules requiring trial courts to calculate class coun-
sel fees using the "lodestar method," which bases the fee primarily on the
hours actually worked by counsel rather than on the benefit provided to
the class by the litigation. The statute allows the supreme court to give
the trial court discretion to increase or decrease the fee award by no more
than four times based on factors specified by the supreme court. The
statute also requires the supreme court to provide in its rules that if any
portion of the benefits recovered for the class come in the form of cou-
pons or other non-cash compensation, the attorney's fees must be
awarded in cash and non-cash amounts in the same proportion as the
recovery for the class.'
Under current law, the Texas Supreme Court may review an interlocu-
tory class certification order only if the order conflicts with a decision of a
court of appeals or of the supreme court.2 House Bill 4 amends the Texas
Government Code to confer jurisdiction on the Texas Supreme Court to
review interlocutory orders certifying or refusing to certify a class.3 The
amended statute also provides that all other proceedings in a class action
on interlocutory appeal are stayed pending disposition of the appeal.
4
B. OFFER OF SETTLEMENT
House Bill 4 amends Section 42 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies
Code to require the Texas Supreme Court to promulgate rules authoriz-
ing trial courts to shift litigation costs, including attorney's fees, to parties
who reject reasonable settlement offers and who obtain a less favorable
result at trial. The cost-shifting mechanism can be triggered only by the
defendant; once triggered, it applies to either side of the litigation. The
statute specifies that if the plaintiff refuses a qualifying offer and obtains
an award of less than eighty percent of the offer, the defendant shall re-
cover litigation costs from the plaintiff. Conversely, if the defendant ref-
uses a qualifying offer from the plaintiff and the plaintiff recovers more
than 120 percent of the offer, the plaintiff shall recover litigation costs
from the defendant. A prevailing party may collect only those litigation
costs incurred after rejection of the settlement offer, and the amount re-
coverable is capped at fifty percent of the economic damages and one
1. Tex. H.B. 4, 2003 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 26, § 1.01, secs. 26.001-26.003, TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE.
2. See, e.g., Schein v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex. 2002).
3. Tex. H.B. 4, 2003 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 22, § 1.02, sec. 22.225(d), TEX. Govr. CODE.
4. Tex. H.B. 4, 2003 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 51, § 1.03, sec. 51.014(b), TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE.
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hundred percent of the noneconomic and punitive damages awarded in
the judgment. The timing of settlement offers and the operation of the
offer of settlement procedure in multiparty cases is to be specified in the
rules adopted by the supreme court.5
The statute and rule establishing the offer of settlement procedure did
not become effective during the Survey period, so the effect of the provi-
sions on toxic and mass tort litigation is uncertain. In general, the offer of
settlement provisions seem designed to raise the stakes in litigation, to
force parties to evaluate settlement offers more realistically, to punish
parties willing to "roll the dice," and to encourage settlement over trial.
Whether the new provision will promote these objectives in the already
high-stakes world of toxic and mass tort litigation, and whether the recip-
rocal nature of the penalties imposed by the provision will discourage any
party from even invoking the process, remains to be seen.
C. MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
House Bill 4 authorizes the transfer of civil actions involving one or
more common questions of fact to a single district court for consolidated
or coordinated pretrial proceedings. The Bill directs the creation of a
judicial panel on multidistrict litigation, consisting of five court of appeals
justices or administrative judges designated by the chief justice of the su-
preme court, which will decide by majority vote whether particular cases
should be transferred. The panel may order a transfer if it determines
that a transfer will promote (1) the convenience of parties and witnesses,
and (2) the just and efficient conduct of the actions. The district judge to
whom the actions are assigned may consider motions for summary judg-
ment or other dispositive motions, but may not conduct a trial on the
merits. The legislation directs the supreme court to adopt rules for the
administration of cases transferred under the multidistrict litigation
statute. 6
The new Texas statute, authorizing statewide transfer and coordination
of multiple actions, resembles the federal statute authorizing multidistrict
litigation proceedings enacted in 1968.7 The primary purpose of both
statutes is to streamline the management of multiple cases with common
issues-such as mass tort litigation-in the early stages of the litigation.
Centralizing the litigation in a single court in the pretrial stage can
achieve efficiencies such as eliminating duplicative discovery, providing
uniform disposition of common legal issues, and promoting coordinated
preparation of the litigation for trial. Aggregating mature litigation in a
single court can be counterproductive, encourage the relitigation of set-
5. Tex. H.B. 4, 2003 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 42, § 2.01, secs. 42.001-42.005, TEX. CiV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE.
6. Tex. H.B. 4, 2003 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 74, § 3.02, secs. 74.161-74.164., TEX. GoVT.
CODE.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1407b (2000).
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tled issues, and delay resolution of individual cases.8 The manner in
which the new Texas panel and Texas transferee courts implement the
multidistrict litigation provisions will have a major impact on mass tort
litigation in Texas in the coming years.
D. VENUE AND FORUM NON CONVENIENS
House Bill 4 broadens the circumstances under which a party can pur-
sue interlocutory appeal of a venue, joinder, or intervention order in a
case involving multiple plaintiffs. Under current law, parties may pursue
interlocutory appeal of joinder and intervention orders, but not of orders
in which a person seeking joinder or intervention has independently es-
tablished proper venue.9 The amended provision allows interlocutory ap-
peal of venue orders as well as joinder and intervention orders in
multiplaintiff cases.1 0
The legislation also amends the language of the forum non conveniens
statute to eliminate the distinction between plaintiffs who are aliens and
those who are residents of the United States. This allows the trial court
to "consider" factors relevant to the forum non conveniens inquiry rather
than to reach a result based on "the preponderance of the evidence."'" It
is unlikely that these stylistic changes will have a significant practical ef-
fect on toxic and mass tort litigation in this state.
E. PROPORTIONATE RESPONSIBILITY
House Bill 4 alters the law governing apportionment of damages in all
tort cases involving multiple tortfeasors, but it will have a particularly
dramatic effect in toxic tort cases, which invariably involve more than one
culpable actor. The legislature made one change specific to toxic tort liti-
gation. Under existing law, a defendant is jointly and severally liable for
the damages recoverable by the plaintiff only if the fact finder assesses
the defendant's percentage of responsibility at greater than fifty percent,
or greater than fifteen percent if the claimant's injury results from a toxic
tort.1 2 House Bill 4 removes the "toxic tort exception" from the rule lim-
iting joint and several liability, thus limiting the defendant's liability in
most toxic tort cases to its percentage of responsibility for the injuries.
8. See, e.g., Blake M. Rhodes, Comment, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litiga-
tion: Time for Rethinking, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 719 (1991) ("Generally, pretrial consoli-
dation will not conserve judicial resources nor serve the interests of the litigants if the cases
are nearing trial in the transferor forum, or if discovery is well along."); MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 33.21, 311 n.1020 (1995) (Centralizing mature litigation,
even if only for pretrial purposes, may "have the effect of delaying disposition and of limit-
ing the judicial resources available for managing mass tort litigation.").
9. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 92, 96 (Tex. 2000).
10. Tex. H.B. 4, 2003 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 15, § 3.03, sec. 15.003, TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE.
11. Tex. H.B. 4, 2003 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 71, § 3.04, sec. 71.051(b), TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE.
12. Act of Sept. 1, 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 136, 1995 TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 33.013(c), repealed by Tex. H.B. 4, 2003 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 4, § 4.10(5).
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Under current law, a defendant may reduce its percentage of responsi-
bility by obtaining findings of the percentage of responsibility of responsi-
ble third parties who were properly joined in the case.13 Current law also
provides that certain parties that the plaintiff could not sue in tort-spe-
cifically, employers covered by worker's compensation insurance, bank-
rupt entities, and parties not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
court-cannot be joined as responsible third parties. 14 House Bill 4 elim-
inates these restrictions on identifying responsible third parties and
makes it easier for a defendant to obtain findings by providing that the
defendant need only designate, and not join, the culpable entity as a re-
sponsible third party.15 The ability of a defendant to attribute responsi-
bility to bankrupt entities and to employers immune from suit is
especially significant in toxic tort cases, which often involve latent injuries
caused by toxic exposures at the workplace.
Because the new rules for apportioning liability effectively limit the de-
fendant's liability to the defendant's percentage of responsibility for the
plaintiff's damages, House Bill 4 eliminates the dollar-for-dollar settle-
ment credit available to defendants under current law. 16 With the
changes in the law of apportioning liability made by House Bill 4, Texas
continues its conversion from a "joint and several" to a "proportionate
responsibility" state.
F. PRODUCT LIABILITY
House Bill 4 makes several changes to Texas substantive products lia-
bility law that may affect practitioners with toxic tort or mass tort cases.
The legislation adds a statute of repose to Texas products liability law,
requiring that, in general, a plaintiff who seeks damages for personal inju-
ries or wrongful death caused by a defective product commence an action
within fifteen years of the date of sale of the product.1 7 The statute fur-
ther provides, however, that it will not apply in cases based on a latent
disease that was first reasonably discoverable more than fifteen years af-
ter the date of sale, if the plaintiff was exposed to the product within
fifteen years of the sale. The "latent disease" exception to the statute of
repose will limit the statute's application in most toxic tort cases.
Other changes in substantive products liability law made by House Bill
4 include limitations on the liability of retailers who sold but did not man-
13. Act of Sept. 1, 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 136, 1995 TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 33.004, amended by Tex. H.B. 4, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 4, § 4.04 (applicable to cases
filed after July 1, 2003).
14. Act of Sept. 1, 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 136, 1995 TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 33.011(6), amended by Tex. H.B. 4, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 4, § 4.05 (applicable to cases
filed after July 1, 2003).
15. Tex. H.B. 4, 2003 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 33, § 4.04, sec. 33.004, TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE (applicable to cases filed after July 1, 2003).
16. Tex. H.B. 4, 2003 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 33, § 4.10(6), sec. 33.014, TEX. Civ. PRAC. &
REM. CODE.
17. Tex. H.B. 4, 2003 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 16, § 5.01, sec. 16.012, TEX. CiV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE.
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ufacture a defective product, 18 a rebuttable presumption that manufac-
turers and sellers of pharmaceutical products marketed with government-
approved warnings are not liable for injuries caused by the products, 19
and a rebuttable presumption that manufacturers and sellers are not lia-
ble for injuries caused by products that comply with mandatory federal
safety statutes or regulations.20 Because of the exceptions in these stat-
utes, and because the presumptions can be rebutted by evidence typically
offered in products cases, the practical effect of these changes on toxic
tort cases is unlikely to be significant.
G. DAMAGES
In one of the few provisions of House Bill 4 that appears favorable to
plaintiffs, the legislation restores the concept of "gross negligence" as a
basis for awarding punitive damages. 21 On the other hand, House Bill 4
makes obtaining a punitive award more difficult by requiring that awards
of punitive damages, unlike awards of compensatory damages, be based
on a unanimous jury verdict. 22 The legislation also limits recovery of
medical expenses to those expenses actually incurred by the plaintiff and
requires the fact finder to consider the effect of federal taxes in awarding
damages for loss of income.23 Although these changes are not specific to
toxic tort litigation, they will affect the recoveries in many toxic tort cases.
H. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY FOR ASBESTOS-RELATED LITIGATION
An unusually specific provision in House Bill 4 caps the liability of cor-
porations for asbestos-related torts committed by a predecessor corpora-
tion at the amount of the assets owned by the predecessor at the time of
the acquisition. 24 The limitation of liability applies only if the acquisition
occurred prior to May 13, 1968, and does not affect the successor corpo-
ration's liability for its own tortious acts. Because the provision appears
narrowly tailored to protect companies who acquired a predecessor
before the dangers of asbestos were widely publicized among commercial
investors, the provision is expected to have only limited application.
18. Tex. H.B. 4, 2003 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 82, § 5.02, sec. 82.003, TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE.
19. Tex.H.B. 4, 2003 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 82, § 5.02, sec. 82.007, TEX. Civ. PRAC. &
REM. CODE.
20. Tex. H.B. 4, 2003 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 82, § 5.02, sec. 82.008, TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE.
21. Tex. H.B. 4, 2003 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 41, § 13.04, sec. 41.003, TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE. The Texas Legislature had eliminated gross negligence as a basis for awarding
punitive damages in its 1995 version of Section 41.003.
22. Id.
23. Tex. H.B. 4, 2003 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 26, § 41.0105, sec. 41.0105, TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE.; Tex. H.B. 4, 2003 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 18, § 13.09, sec. 18.091, TEX. CIv. PRAC.
& REM. CODE.
24. Tex. H.B. 4, 2003 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 149, § 17.01, secs. 149.001-149.006, TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE.
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II. TEXAS CASE LAW: SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
A. DUTIES AND DEFENSES
1. Products Liability: The "Sophisticated Employer" and "Bulk
Supplier" Defenses
While awaiting the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Humble Sand &
Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez,2 5 the Texas intermediate appellate courts had sev-
eral opportunities to decide how the duty of a product supplier to a user
or a bystander is affected by the presence of an intermediary that controls
the use of the product. In U.S. Silica Co. v. Tompkins, the Beaumont
Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff, finding that the
defendant failed to establish that the decedent's employer was a "sophis-
ticated user" with actual knowledge of the dangers of silica exposure.
U.S. Silica did not place warnings on its silica products in the 1960s and
1970s, when the decedent used its products; however, the silica the dece-
dent used in the 1980s did bear a warning, and the decedent continued to
use the products with the same type of respiratory equipment. The court
held this evidence insufficient to overturn the jury's verdict because U.S.
Silica did not establish that the 1980s warning was adequate and noticea-
ble or that it informed the decedent that his current safety precautions
were insufficient. The court also held that the "sophisticated user" or
"intermediary" defense would not excuse U.S. Silica of its duty to warn
product users because the evidence did not show the decedent's employ-
ers knew of the risk and any instruction on the issue was unnecessary
surplusage because factual determinations relevant to the defense were
encompassed in the broad-form causation instructions. 26
In contrast, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in Houston af-
firmed summary judgment in favor of benzene suppliers based on the
"bulk supplier" defense in Wood v. Phillips Petroleum Co. Various petro-
leum industry manufacturers offered evidence that the plaintiff's em-
ployer, Monsanto, had extensive information about the hazards of
benzene exposure and the methods used to minimize that exposure. Be-
cause the manufacturers were bulk suppliers with "no package of [their]
own on which to place a label," the manufacturers' duty to warn was sat-
isfied by proof that the plaintiff's employer understood the risks. 27 Al-
though it noted that "[t]he question in any case is whether a bulk supplier
has a reasonable assurance that its warning will reach those endangered
by the use of its product," the court did not address whether the manufac-
turers were reasonable in relying on Monsanto to pass on the necessary
warnings, relying solely on evidence of Monsanto's knowledge rather
25. Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, 48 S.W.3d 487 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2001, pet. granted). The Supreme Court of Texas granted petition for review on May 30,
2002 and heard arguments on October 30, 2002.
26. U.S. Silica Co. v. Tompkins, 92 S.W.3d 605, 609 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, no
pet.).
27. Wood v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 119 S.W.3d 870, 874-75 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2003, pet. filed).
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than evidence of its safety or warning policies and the manufacturers'
awareness of those policies.
28
2. Premises Liability
In Dyall v. Simpson Pasadena Paper Co., the Fourteenth District Court
of Appeals in Houston affirmed a summary judgment for a premises
owner who did not exercise control over the work of an injured indepen-
dent contractor. When Dyall, an independent contractor, arrived at the
Simpson paper mill to repair a leaking pipeline, he was not informed that
the pipe carried chlorine dioxide and was led to believe that the leaking
liquid was not dangerous. Simpson did not identify the leaking substance,
did not provide any safety warnings, and did not give Dyall safety data
sheets. A Simpson employee informed Dyall that he would not need an
air pack. After working on the leaking pipe flange, Dyall began coughing
and choking on the fumes, became nauseous and vomited, and developed
severe respiratory problems. Under Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Prac-
tice and Remedies Code, a premises owner is not liable for injuries aris-
ing from the failure to provide a safe workplace unless the premises
owner exercised or retained some control over the manner in which the
work was performed and had actual knowledge of the danger, but failed
to warn. Plaintiffs conceded that Simpson did not control the manner in
which Dyall performed the repairs but contended that Simpson exercised
control over safety sufficient to satisfy Chapter 95 when a Simpson em-
ployee told Dyall he did not need an air pack and instead directed him to
use an escape respirator in a certain area of the plant. The court of ap-
peals found these allegations insufficient to demonstrate a right of con-
trol, pointing to the protections available to Dyall that he ultimately
chose not to use. The court also noted that Dyall was told that the pipe
was not empty, that he could see liquid dripping from the flange, and that
the leak was within twenty-five feet of a sign warning of the presence of
chlorine dioxide and recommending the use of goggles, a face shield, and
a respirator. The court decided that Chapter 95 applied to the plaintiffs'
claims and that summary judgment was properly granted for Simpson.29
3. The "Known Danger" Defense
In In re Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. Litigation, a federal magis-
trate found that the defendant, an arsenic manufacturer, had no duty to
warn community members of the dangers of arsenic because the danger
was commonly known, the scope of a duty to warn all potentially affected
communities would be too great, and the arsenic had been transformed
through processing into a liquid waste that was no longer the defendant's
28. Id. at 874. But see Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc., 48 S.W.3d at 496 ("Proof that the
intermediary knew that the product was dangerous does not, in and of itself, absolve the
supplier of a duty to warn ultimate users.").
29. Dyall v. Simpson Pasadena Paper Co., No. 14-01-00432-CV, 2003 WL 21664163
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] July 17, 2003, no pet.).
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product. ASARCO shipped arsenic by railcar to a pesticide plant in
Commerce, Texas, where unlined waste disposal pits were found to vio-
late the Texas Water Quality Control Act. The liquid waste was moved to
unlined pits near Ridgeway, Texas, where arsenic was later found in the
water supply. The court found that the connection between any product
defect and the personal injuries and property damage alleged by the
Ridgeway residents was too attenuated to support liability. The court
held that the dangers of arsenic exposure "were within the realm of 'com-
mon knowledge"' and that requiring a manufacturer transporting chemi-
cals over long distances to warn every community receiving those
chemicals, and perhaps every community along the transportation route,
would be too difficult for the courts to supervise. 30 The plaintiffs also
could not recover because they were exposed to liquid waste in which
"ASARCO's arsenic underwent fundamental changes to its identity,"
rather than to the product as ASARCO sold it.3 1
4. Statute of Repose
In two cases released during the Survey period, the Tyler Court of Ap-
peals interpreted the statute of repose to be applicable to engineers,
builders, and designers of improvements to real property and manufac-
turing equipment. In Brown & Root, Inc. v. Shelton, the court held that
the statute did not bar claims against a contractor based on asbestos ex-
posure that occurred in part before the contractor's industrial machinery
was annexed to real property. The court noted that although the asbes-
tos-containing materials installed by Brown & Root constituted an im-
provement, at least some of the plaintiff's exposure occurred during the
pre-installation and pre-construction phases, before those materials were
sufficiently annexed to the property to be considered improvements. 32
On the other hand, in Cofer v. Ferro Corp., the court affirmed summary
judgment based on the statute of repose in favor of a manufacturer,
Ferro, who designed and constructed kilns in the early 1960s at the facility
where the plaintiff was later employed. The court found that the kilns
were improvements to real property and would be protected by the stat-
ute, observing that the plaintiff presented no evidence of any willful mis-
conduct or fraudulent concealment that might prevent the operation of
the statute of repose. 33
30. In re Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. Litig., No. Civ. 3:94-CV-2477-H, Civ. 3:96-
CV-1927-H, Civ. 3:96-CV-1929-H, Civ. 3:96-CV-2985-H, Civ. 3:96-CV-2993-H, Civ. 3:96-
CV-3057-H, Civ. 3:96-CV-3094-H, Civ. 3:96-CV-3098-H, Civ. 3:97-CV-0055-H, 2003 WL
21499262, report and recommendations adopted, 2003 WL 21664856, at *7 (N.D. Tex. June
24, 2003).
31. Id. at *7-8.
32. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Shelton, No. 12-01-00259-CV, 2003 WL 21771917, at *4
(Tex. App.-Tyler 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
33. Cofer v. Ferro Corp., No. 12-02-00151-CV, 2003 WL 21804821, at *4 (Tex. App.-
Tyler 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
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B. SUFFICIENCY AND ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT PROOF OF
SCIENTIFIC CAUSATION
Trial and appellate courts have continued to scrutinize expert opinion
evidence in toxic tort cases to determine if such evidence has a valid sci-
entific foundation. During the Survey period, appellate courts invariably
affirmed trial court rulings excluding expert scientific testimony for lack
of reliability. For example, in Allison v. Fire Insurance Exchange, the
Austin Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of the plaintiff's expert
testimony that exposure to toxic mold in his home caused the plaintiff to
develop toxic encephalopathy; consequently, the court affirmed summary
judgment for the insurer on the plaintiff's personal injury claims. The
plaintiff's expert testified that it was premature to calculate a confidence
interval or risk factor from the study results he relied upon, and he could
not say whether the techniques used in the study were generally accepted;
thus, the testimony was unreliable according to the standards set out in
Merrell Down Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner.34 The court also noted
that Havner requires a doubling of the risk of injury to establish general
causation, but the Havner court was unwilling to designate a relative risk
of 2.0 a "bright-line boundary" or "litmus test" for proving causation.35
In fact, while strength of association is relevant in determining general
causation, the Havner court's reference to "doubling of the risk" is most
directly relevant in the application of epidemiology to the requirement
that a plaintiff prove specific causation, i.e., that it is "more likely than
not" that a particular substance caused his illness.36
The First District Court of Appeals in Houston has affirmed trial court
orders excluding expert testimony of causation in a variety of circum-
stances. In Daniels v. Lyondell-Citgo Refining Co., Ltd., the court af-
firmed summary judgment against the family of a refinery worker who
died from bronchial alveolar carcinoma allegedly caused by benzene ex-
posure because it found no evidence of general causation. The plaintiffs'
experts relied on three studies to support their conclusion that benzene
causes bronchial alveolar carcinoma, but the court observed that follow-
up studies to each of the three, which enlarged the sample size, (and in
one case, the original study as well) failed to show a doubling of the risk.
The court found that if the risk were not doubled, the results were statisti-
cally insignificant and did not support general causation. Again, the sig-
nificance of "doubling of the risk" is more properly addressed to specific
causation. This distinction, however, would not have affected the out-
come of the court's analysis since, pursuant to its review of the articles,
the court would have found no evidence of specific causation had it ad-
34. Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., 98 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. abated)
(citing Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 717 (Tex. 1997), cert denied
118 S. Ct. 1799).
35. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 718-19.
36. Id. at 717.
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dressed that issue.37
In Crofton v. Amoco Chemical Co., the First District Court of Appeals
in Houston affirmed summary judgment against residents living in the
vicinity of a hazardous waste superfund site because the plaintiffs' experts
did not provide testimony that exposure to chemicals from the site caused
any specific illness suffered by the plaintiffs. Dr. Arch Carson, a special-
ist in preventative medicine and occupational medicine, testified that
based on his review of the medical records, the plaintiffs' illnesses "corre-
spond well" to expected risks from chemicals found at the superfund site,
but he failed to link any plaintiff's particular illness to specific chemical
exposures from the site.38 Plaintiffs' toxicologist, Dr. K.C. Donnelly, tes-
tified that the plaintiffs were exposed to "a mixture of chemicals released
from the MOTCO site," which "included agents that are capable of irrita-
tion, as well as chemicals known to initiate . . . and promote . . . the
carcinogenic process."'39 Dr. Donnelly, however, did not attribute any
specific illness to such exposure. The plaintiffs' engineers calculated
chemical concentrations, emission rates, and dispersion through the air
and ground around the plaintiffs' residences, but they did not attempt to
link any plaintiff's illness to chemical exposures from the site. The court
concluded that the plaintiffs had produced no evidence of causation to
support their claims for personal injury or medical monitoring. The court
also found that the plaintiffs had not proposed specific protocol for medi-
cal monitoring or provided evidence that such monitoring was medically
necessary.
In Brookshire Bros., Inc. v. Smith, the First District Court of Appeals in
Houston held that a material safety data sheet (MSDS) could not provide
the basis for an expert opinion of general causation in a chemical expo-
sure case. The plaintiff was diagnosed with reactive airways dysfunction
syndrome (RADS) after working with certain commercial cleaners in a
grocery store bakery and bathroom over a two-day period. Dr. Gary
Friedman testified, based on his review of the medical records, the plain-
tiff's account of his exposure, the warning labels on the commercial clean-
ers used by the plaintiff, and the MSDS for those products, that the
plaintiff's RADS was caused by his exposure to toxins in those cleaners.
The court held that Dr. Friedman's reliance on the warning labels and the
MSDS was insufficient to provide his opinion with evidentiary value be-
cause those sources do not disclose "the scientific foundation used in for-
mulating the conclusions contained in either the MSDS or the warning
37. Daniels v. Lyondell-Citgo Ref. Co., Ltd., 99 S.W.3d 722, 730 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2003, no. pet.) ("Because the Daniels family failed to present summary judgment
evidence sufficient to raise a fact question concerning general causation, we need not ad-
dress their second point of error asserting that they offered sufficient proof of specific
causation.").
38. Crofton v. Amoco Chem. Co., No. 01-01-00526-CV, 2003 WL 21297588, at *5 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
39. Id.
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labels."' 40 Although Dr. Friedman mentioned two peer-reviewed articles,
these articles were mentioned only in passing and did not provide the
necessary support for Dr. Friedman's conclusions.
Across the hall, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in Houston
has similarly upheld trial court decisions excluding expert opinion evi-
dence of a causal relationship between the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's injuries. In Frias v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the court affirmed
summary judgment against the family of a refinery worker who died of
aplastic anemia allegedly caused by occupational exposure to benzene.
As the First District Court of Appeals has tended to do, the Fourteenth
District Court of Appeals also framed its discussion in terms of general
causation "whether a substance is capable of causing a particular injury or
condition in the general population. '41 While the court acknowledged
that "it is undisputed that, at some level and length of exposure, benzene
causes aplastic anemia," the court ruled that the plaintiff's evidence of
general causation failed because it did not reliably establish the lower
limit of dose and exposure time at which the substance could cause dis-
ease.42 The court instead might have addressed this as a specific causa-
tion issue, that is, whether the plaintiff's dose, exposure, and onset of
injury is similar enough to those observed in the relevant studies.43 Ad-
dressing specific causation, the court found that the testimony quantifying
the plaintiff's exposure that the plaintiff was "consistently exposed to ben-
zene levels in the 10 to 20 ppm range ... and that he had regular expo-
sures above 100 ppm ... [with o]ccasional peak exposures of hundreds of
ppm and, in some cases, approaching 1000 ppm," was insufficiently pre-
cise to establish any particular level of exposure. 44
In Exxon Corp. v. Makofski, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals
in Houston reversed judgment in favor of two minor plaintiffs alleging
physical illness, including one case of acute lymphocytic leukemia (ALL),
because the expert testimony amounted to no evidence that benzene ex-
posure from contaminated well water caused any of plaintiff's past, pre-
sent, or probable future illness. The court found that only one of the
studies relied upon by plaintiffs' experts showed a statistically significant
increase (at a ninety-five percent confidence level) in the incidence of
ALL in benzene-exposed populations, and the results of even that study
were suspect because of questionable diagnoses and its inconsistency with
other studies of refinery workers. A government registry of disease inci-
40. Brookshire Bros., Inc. v. Smith, No. 01-02-00677-CV, 2003 WL 23123043, at *4
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 31, 2003, no pet. h.).
41. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 714.
42. Frias v. At. Richfield Co., 104 S.W.3d 925, 928-29 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
43. Havner, 953 S.W. 2d at 720 ("A claimant must show that he or she is similar to
those in the studies. This would include proof that the injured person was exposed to the
same substance, that the exposure or dose levels were comparable to or greater than those
in the studies, that the exposure occurred before the onset of injury, and that the timing of
the onset of injury was consistent with that experienced by those in the study.").
44. Frias, 104 S.W.3d at 930-31 (emphasis in original).
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dence in the plaintiffs' community was not helpful because it denied any
attempt to show causal relationships to benzene exposure, it admitted po-
tential bias in disease reporting, and it grouped diseases by category so
that the incidence of ALL was impossible to discern. Moreover, the testi-
mony of plaintiffs' experts was flawed because they departed from the
standards accepted outside the courtroom, applying lower confidence
levels and broader disease grouping than would be accepted in epidemio-
logical research and reanalyzing studies to find statistical significance
where the study authors did not. One expert testified in contradiction to
the opinion he offered in his published textbook. The court found no
evidence that benzene exposure caused the plaintiffs' ALL. The court
also found no evidence that benzene exposure caused the other plaintiff's
anemia several years before because, having failed to test for iron defi-
ciency when the anemia was diagnosed, the plaintiff was unable to ex-
clude the most common source of anemia.
45
In Praytor v. Ford Motor Co., the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals
in Houston affirmed the trial court's ruling that no competent evidence
supported the plaintiff's claim that chemicals released when her air bag
deployed caused her to develop asthma and sinusitis. The court noted
that the trial court might have found the plaintiff's experts unqualified to
testify on causation because the plaintiff's pulmonologist admitted that he
was not an expert on asthma and its causes or on the toxicity of chemicals
released by air bags, and the plaintiff's automotive safety consultant knew
nothing about medical causation. The trial court also might have deter-
mined that the proposed causation testimony was fatally unreliable be-
cause the pulmonologist did not rule out other causes or demonstrate that
"his theory has been tested, subject to peer review, or that his theory is
generally accepted outside of the courtroom by the relevant scientific
community. '46 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that
the expert's opinion, based on the temporal relationship between the
plaintiff's exposure and symptom onset, along with his personal observa-
tion of two similar cases, was unreliable and did not raise an issue of fact
regarding causation.
Breaking the trend toward excluding expert testimony regarding causa-
tion, the Beaumont Court of Appeals found error in a trial court's exclu-
sion of a CT scan report-only to hold that the error was harmless
because the report was cumulative of other evidence. In U.S. Silica Co. v.
Tompkins, a defense expert prepared a report that purported to evaluate
a high resolution CT scan, but referred to an earlier date on which a regu-
lar CT scan was performed. The expert reported no evidence of intersti-
45. Exxon Corp. v. Makofski, 116 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003,
pet. filed). The court also affirmed the trial court's judgment against five adult plaintiffs
whom the jury found suffered only mental anguish because, in the absence of current dis-
ease or evidence that disease is likely to develop in the future, Texas law does not allow
recovery of mental anguish damages. Id. at 190-91.
46. Praytor v. Ford Motor Co., 97 S.W.3d 237, 244-45 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
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tial fibrosis, but the high resolution CT scan was lost by the hospital and
could not be reviewed by the plaintiff's expert. The plaintiff claimed that
the report was too unreliable to be relevant, but the court held that the
report was relevant to the decedent's disease progression and the "at-
tendant circumstances went to the weight of the evidence rather than its
admissibility. '47 The error was harmless, however, because pathologists
for both parties found evidence of silicosis in the decedent's lungs, none
of the testifying experts relied on the CT scan or report at issue, and the
report "was subject to serious attack on its reliability that substantially
affected its weight." 48
The federal trial courts have been equally skeptical of scientific evi-
dence of causation in toxic tort cases. In Newton v. Roche Laboratories,
Inc., a federal district court excluded the testimony of two plaintiffs' ex-
perts that Accutane causes schizophrenia because the medical literature
did not support their opinions. The plaintiffs' sixteen-year-old daughter
took Accutane for approximately one month when her parents noted psy-
chological problems, which deteriorated until she was diagnosed with se-
vere schizophrenia. The court rejected the general causation opinion
offered by James O'Donnell because he was unqualified, having no medi-
cal or pharmacological degree, no experience in the causes of psychosis,
and no non-litigation research concerning Accutane or its ingredients.
The court also rejected his opinion because he relied on anecdotal case
reports, isolated adverse event reports, and the journal of a nineteenth-
century arctic explorer, but ignored hundreds of published, peer-re-
viewed scientific articles on retinoids, including Accutane, which found
no connection between these substances and the development of schizo-
phrenia. Dr. Lyle Rossiter, on the other hand, was qualified to act as an
expert witness, but his testimony was undermined by his dependence on
O'Donnell's opinion. Dr. Rossiter's reliance on the temporal connection
between the teenager's Accutane use and her schizophrenia was not a
reliable basis for inferring a causal link, and also the Physician's Desk
Reference and insert warnings were no evidence of general causation be-
cause the standards for issuing those warnings do not coincide with legal
proof of causation. Finally, the doctor did not adequately consider and
eliminate other possible causes of the teenager's schizophrenia, such as
childhood malnutrition, an elderly parent, and a strong family history of
the disease.49
In Burleson v. Glass, a federal district court excluded the opinion of the
plaintiff's expert that exposure to thoriated tungsten welding rods over a
period of two years contributed to the plaintiff's throat and lung cancers.
The court noted that plaintiff's expert, Dr. Arch Carson, a specialist in
occupational medicine and toxicology, admitted that he had not calcu-
47. U.S. Silica Co. v. Tompkins, 92 S.W.3d 605, 612 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, no
pet.).
48. Id. at 613.
49. Newton v. Roche Labs., Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 672 (W.D. Tex. 2002).
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lated the plaintiff's radiation dose from exposure to the welding rods, that
there were no published studies linking thoriated tungsten welding rods
to these cancers, and that a two-year latency period between exposure
and manifestation of cancer was unusually short. Dr. Carson's radiation
"hot spot" theory-that continual, low dose exposure to radiation caused
by inhaled particles from the welding rods causes cancer-had been the
subject of laboratory research and case reports, but it had not been the
subject of epidemiological studies. In addition, the expert admitted that
there was significant uncertainty about whether the plaintiff's exposure
had caused his cancers.50 On the other hand, the experts agreed that
smoking had been linked to these cancers and that the plaintiff's forty-
five year, two-pack-per-day smoking history showed a more predictable
latency period to manifestation of the plaintiff's cancer. The court noted
that the smoking evidence created a high rate of error for the expert's
theory, but it appears that this flaw in the expert's opinion would be more
accurately described as the failure to exclude other potential causes. The
court excluded Dr. Carson's opinions as unreliable and, consequently,
granted summary judgment to the defendant because the plaintiff could
offer no evidence of causation.
C. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In Brown & Root, Inc. v. Moore, the Texarkana Court of Appeals af-
firmed an award of punitive damages against a contractor (Brown &
Root) whose work on the premises of the plaintiff's employer caused the
plaintiff to be exposed to asbestos and develop mesothelioma. Brown &
Root argued that the record contained "no evidence that Brown & Root,
the corporation, acted with malice. '51 The court observed that the statu-
tory definition of malice includes both an objective and a subjective com-
ponent-the plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct, viewed
objectively, involves an extreme risk of harm and that the defendant has
actual, subjective knowledge of the extreme risk. To support the objec-
tive prong of malice, the court noted evidence that "it was common
knowledge as far back as 1930 that asbestos posed a serious health risk"
and that the causal link between asbestos exposure and lung cancer was
accepted in 1949 and the causal link to mesothelioma was accepted in
1960.52 The court also noted Texas regulations passed in 1958 to regulate
asbestos exposure and OSHA regulations passed in 1972. In finding suf-
ficient evidence that Brown & Root was subjectively aware of the risk
and proceeded with conscious indifference, the court rejected Brown &
Root's contention that the evidence must establish an act by a vice princi-
pal, noting that the Texas Supreme Court has recognized authorizing or
ratifying the gross negligence of an agent or grossly negligent hiring of an
50. Burleson v. Glass, 268 F. Supp. 2d 699, 706-07 (W.D. Tex. 2003).
51. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Moore, 92 S.W.3d 848, 851 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002,
pet. denied) (emphasis in original).
52. Id. at 852.
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unfit agent as equal bases to support punitive damages. Although Brown
& Root knew that the regulations required it to monitor the air at its
work sites and while it did monitor some work sites it did not perform air
monitoring at Lone Star Steel (plaintiff's work site). Brown & Root did
not begin air sampling for more than three years after the OSHA regula-
tions required such monitoring. Although the evidence showed that
Brown & Root was aware of the precautions to take from its work at
Exxon premises where such protections were required, Brown & Root
failed to implement similar protections, to monitor the air, or to warn
workers at Lone Star Steel, possibly from concern for the "enormous"
cost involved. 53 The court found the facts in this case very similar to the
facts in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender and held that because Brown & Root
"proceeded with extreme caution and protected workers possibly coming
into contact with asbestos" when it worked at the Exxon premises, but
did not apply those safety policies when it worked at Lone Star Steel, the
evidence was sufficient to show that Brown & Root acted with malice.5 4
In contrast, in Quigley Co. v. Calderon, the El Paso Court of Appeals
affirmed an award of compensatory damages to a plaintiff suffering from
asbestosis, but reversed the award of punitive damages because it found
no evidence to support the malice finding. The plaintiff presented evi-
dence that the plaintiff was exposed to Insulag manufactured by Quigley
"almost daily during the 1950s and 1960s."' 55 To show malice, the plaintiff
relied on a 1959 report to Quigley that "the [Insulag] mixture of cement,
asbestos, and brick dust presented an asbestosis exposure" and that the
exposure in the plant was well above the prescribed threshold limit set by
the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists. 56 The
plaintiff also presented expert testimony that, by the late 1950s, there
were well over one hundred articles in the medical literature that dis-
cussed the incidence of asbestos-related disease in individuals working
with asbestos-containing products. But the court of appeals noted that a
former Quigley employee testified that "it was not clear until the 1970s
that asbestos was dangerous" or whether products containing a relatively
low percentage of asbestos were dangerous. 57 The court found no evi-
dence that (1) viewed objectively from Quigley's point of view in the
1950s and 1960s, the use of Quigley's product "involved an extreme de-
gree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential
harm to others," and (2) during the 1950s and 1960s, Quigley "had actual
subjective awareness of the risks . . . but still proceeded with conscious
indifference. ,58
53. Id. at 853-54.
54. Id. at 855 (discussing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender, 968 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. 1998)).
55. Quigley Co. v. Calderon, No. 08-01-00346-CV, 2003 WL 77256, at *6 (Tex. App.-
El Paso 2003, pet. denied) (mer. op.).
56. Id.
57. Id. at *7.
58. Id.
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In Zacharie v. U.S. Natural Resources, Inc., the San Antonio Court of
Appeals ruled that the plaintiffs could pursue exemplary damages from
the decedent's employer for the decedent's wrongful death notwithstand-
ing the exclusive remedy provision of the Texas Worker's Compensation
Act (TWCA). The court distinguished the Texas Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Travelers Indemnity Co. of Illinois v. Fuller59 that the plaintiff can-
not assert such a claim against the employer's insurer, noting that the
TWCA expressly prohibits claims against a workers' compensation car-
rier, but expressly permits claims against an employer for exemplary
damages for gross negligence that causes the decedent's death.
60
III. TEXAS CASE LAW: PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. ATTORNEY DISQUALIFICATION
In In re TXU Holdings Co., the Waco Court of Appeals conditionally
granted a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to disqualify plain-
tiff's counsel based on the former employment of an attorney, Ms.
Mortola-Strasser, who, before being admitted to the bar, worked as a le-
gal assistant for defendant's counsel. The evidence showed that, while
employed by defendant's counsel, Ms. Mortola-Strasser assisted in de-
fending TXU in asbestos cases. After being licensed as an attorney, Ms.
Mortola-Strasser was hired by a plaintiffs' firm that was also active in
asbestos litigation. The plaintiffs' firm signed an agreement that it would
not participate in "any claims or suits against TXU alleging asbestos ex-
posure," and the firm honored that agreement during the term of Ms.
Mortola-Strasser's employment. 61 Shortly after Ms. Mortola-Strasser left
the firm, however, the plaintiffs' firm filed suit against TXU. Acknowl-
edging the "conclusive presumption" that, as a non-lawyer on cases in-
volving TXU, Ms. Mortola-Strasser had access to TXU confidences, the
court considered whether it should apply the rebuttable presumption that
a non-lawyer has shared the confidences of a former client or the irrebut-
table presumption that an attorney has done so.62 The court determined
that because Ms. Mortola-Strasser was now an attorney and the concern
about restricting the mobility of non-lawyers was not implicated, the bet-
ter result would be to apply the irrebuttable presumption applicable to
lawyers and disqualify the firm from representing plaintiffs against TXU.
B. CLASS CERTIFICATION
Demonstrating the now-customary reluctance to certify class actions of
claims involving personal injury, the Fourteenth District Court of Ap-
peals in Houston, in Stobaugh v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., affirmed a
trial court order denying class certification to cruise line passengers who
59. Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill. v. Fuller, 892 S.W.2d 848, 853 (Tex. 1995).
60. Zacharie v. U.S. Natural Res., Inc., 94 S.W.3d 748, 757-58 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2002, no pet.).
61. In re TXU Holdings Co., 110 S.W.3d 62, 64 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, no pet.).
62. Id. at 65-67.
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suffered various injuries when their ship traveled through a hurricane at
sea. The plaintiffs alleged claims based on breach of contract, breach of
express and implied warranties, negligent misrepresentation, negligence,
and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and addition-
ally sought damages for physical injury and emotional distress. Because
the trial court did not indicate the basis for its denial of certification, the
court of appeals reviewed the trial court's implied finding that the passen-
gers failed to satisfy the predominance requirement of Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 42. In doing so, the court emphasized that the predominance
requirement must be rigorously applied and that a class should not be
certified unless it is determined that individual issues can be considered in
a manageable, time-efficient, and fair manner. Applying that analysis,
the court concluded that the passengers had not shown that common fact
questions predominated as to any of the alleged claims. 63 For example,
although the passengers alleged that all proposed class members took the
same cruise under the same contract, the court found evidence in the re-
cord that contract formation was not the same for all passengers; thus,
common fact questions did not predominate on issues of contract forma-
tion or reliance. With respect to damages, the court of appeals restated
the general principle that class action treatment is rarely appropriate for
resolving personal injury claims; the passengers suffered a variety of
physical injuries and varying degrees of emotional distress and fear, but
attempted to create predominance by proposing a "one size fits all" dam-
ages award, of which the court disapproved. 64 To the extent specific pas-
sengers took a "one size fits all" award and gave up substantial rights to
individualized damages, the court found it unclear that a class action
would be a superior method to resolve those passengers' claims. The
court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
class certification. 65
C. INTERVENTION, SERVICE, AND LIMITATIONS
In Baker v. Monsanto Co., the Texas Supreme Court ruled that, al-
though intervenors are required to serve a defendant formally with cita-
tion and cannot rely on service by certified mail, the defendant waived
the service defect by filing an answer and thereby making a general ap-
pearance. The original plaintiffs sued several defendants, including Mon-
santo, alleging personal injury and property damage caused by a
Superfund site. Before the original plaintiffs served Monsanto with cita-
tion, the intervenors filed their petition and served it on Monsanto via
certified mail. Monsanto refused service because it had not yet been
served with citation, and the intervenors made no further attempt at ser-
vice. The trial court granted Monsanto's motion for summary judgment
63. Stobaugh v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 105 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
64. Id. at 309-10.
65. Id. at 312.
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asserting limitations as an affirmative defense against the intervenors. As
reported in the last Survey, the First District Court of Appeals in Hous-
ton affirmed summary judgment, holding that because Monsanto was not
yet a party to the underlying suit when the intervenors attempted service,
the intervenors were required to serve Monsanto personally rather than
by certified mail. The appellate court specifically rejected the interven-
ors' argument that Monsanto waived any defect in service by filing an
answer in the underlying lawsuit. In a per curiam opinion, the supreme
court agreed that delivering the petition in intervention by certified mail
was ineffective to bring Monsanto within the jurisdiction of the court, but
the court ruled that Monsanto made a general appearance when it an-
swered the plaintiffs' complaint, which relieved the intervenors of the re-
sponsibility for serving Monsanto with citation. Finding waiver, the
supreme court held that summary judgment for Monsanto was erroneous,
reversed the court of appeals' judgment, and remanded the case to the
trial court.66
In Zacharie v. U.S. Natural Resources, Inc., the San Antonio Court of
Appeals held that a worker's occupational disease claim against her em-
ployer accrued when her doctor diagnosed her illness, but her children's
causes of action for gross negligence accrued upon her death. The worker
was diagnosed with "pneumoconiosis, probably silicosis," timely filed a
personal injury suit against her employer, but did not serve the defendant
with citation.67 After the employee's death, her children amended the
original petition to add wrongful death, survival, gross negligence, negli-
gence per se claims, and additional alternative claims for other diseases.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants on limita-
tions grounds. The court of appeals affirmed in part, holding that the
worker's personal injury claims accrued on the date of her diagnosis be-
cause she knew that she had a lung disease and that it was likely work-
related. Although her action was timely filed, summary judgment was
proper because the decedent failed to serve the defendants during the
limitations period and lacked due diligence as a matter of law; the cita-
tions sat unclaimed for months, and the attorneys did not attempt to actu-
ally serve the defendants or check the status of the citations. Although
the children's amended claims alleged that the worker suffered from
other diseases, they presented no evidence that these diseases were the
result of separate disease processes, and these claims also accrued on the
date of the worker's original diagnosis. 68 The court allowed the children
to proceed with their claim for punitive damages based on the gross negli-
gence of the worker's employer, however, holding that this was an inde-
pendent claim accruing on her death.
66. Baker v. Monsanto Co., 111 S.W.3d 158 (Tex. 2003).
67. Zacharie v. U.S. Natural Res., Inc., 94 S.W.3d 748, 751 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2002, no pet.).
68. Id. at 752.
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In Jones v. Alcoa, Inc., the Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal based on
limitations in a case brought against Alcoa by former African-American
employees who alleged that Alcoa discriminated against them in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by assigning them to work in areas where employees
were regularly exposed to large quantities of asbestos dust. The district
court granted Alcoa's motion to dismiss the claims as time-barred. The
Fifth Circuit agreed, observing that a § 1981 claim is governed by the
most closely analogous limitation provision in state law; in this case, the
plaintiffs' claims must have been brought within the limitations period for
personal injury actions in Texas, which is within two years after the cause
of action accrued. The plaintiffs' employment discrimination claims "ac-
crued" when the plaintiffs knew or reasonably should have known that
the challenged discriminatory act occurred. Although the plaintiffs ar-
gued that their knowledge of the discriminatory act could not have oc-
curred until they began to experience symptoms of asbestos exposure, the
Fifth Circuit disagreed, observing that the discriminatory act that caused
plaintiffs' exposure was the assignment to areas where exposure was
likely. Because the workers knew or should have known of that discrimi-
natory act while at Alcoa from 1953 to 1970, their claims were barred by
limitations. Finding the claims time-barred, the court did not resolve
whether Alcoa's allegedly discriminatory assignment of plaintiffs to as-
bestos-laden work areas was actionable under § 1981.69
D. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND FORUM NON CONVENIENS
In Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Kwasnik, the El Paso Court of Appeals
upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident former
employer for injuries to the plaintiff caused by workplace asbestos expo-
sure outside the state of Texas.70 The court first embraced legal suffi-
ciency as the proper standard for reviewing a trial court's order denying a
special appearance, citing the Texas Supreme Court's holding in BMC
Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand.71 Applying this standard, the court
found more than a scintilla of evidence to support denial of Hoffmann-La
Roche's special appearance. Although it was incorporated in New Jersey,
Hoffmann-La Roche had conducted business in Texas since the 1950s and
had continued to do business in Texas and maintain a registered agent for
service of process in Texas. Additionally, Hoffmann-La Roche owned a
plant in Texas and established a sales force in Texas that directly mar-
keted its products to physicians. The court of appeals found the plaintiff's
evidence sufficient to support the denial of Hoffman-LaRoche's special
69. Jones v. Alcoa, Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 361 (5th Cir. 2003).
70. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Kwasnik, 109 S.W.3d 21 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2003,
no pet.). Although the opinion does not expressly state that the plaintiff's exposure (and
contact with Hoffmann-La Roche's tortuous conduct) occurred outside Texas, that fact
may be assumed based on the plaintiff's reliance on general, rather than specific, causation.
Id. at 25.
71. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2001).
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appearance. 72
In Koll Real Estate Group, Inc. v. Purseley, the First District Court of
Appeals in Houston considered whether a non-resident corporation's
agreement to indemnify another for losses incurred in Texas is a sufficient
basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over the non-resident corpora-
tion. The plaintiffs brought asbestos suits against Koll, alleging that as
the successor-in-interest to the M.W. Kellogg Company, Koll was liable
for injuries caused by Kellogg. Koll challenged personal jurisdiction in
Texas, but the trial court denied Koll's special appearance, and Koll filed
an interlocutory appeal. The appellate court distilled the corporate his-
tory to a few relevant facts: Kellogg was a subsidiary of Henley I, which
sold Kellogg to Dresser and agreed to indemnify Dresser for liability aris-
ing from Kellogg's jobs in Texas, including the tort liability alleged by the
plaintiffs; Henley I then transferred its rights and liabilities to Henley II,
later known as Koll. The plaintiffs argued that Kellogg's contacts should
be imputed to Koll because Koll's predecessor, Henley II, agreed to in-
demnify Dresser for Kellogg's liabilities, some of which occurred in
Texas. The appellate court disagreed, finding no evidence that Koll as-
sumed contractual liability to third parties for torts that occurred in Texas
and noting that, at most, Koll inherited Henley II's responsibility to in-
demnify Dresser for any liability that Dresser suffered as a result of Kel-
logg's contacts. Noting that Texas courts have held that indemnification
agreements alone are not minimum contacts, the court further explained
that even if the indemnity agreement did constitute a sufficient minimum
contact, jurisdiction would not be proper because the plaintiff's cause of
action did not arise out of that contact. The court reversed and remanded
with instructions to dismiss the claims against Koll for lack of personal
jurisdiction. 73
In In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., the Texas Supreme Court
refused to apply the "relation back" doctrine to allow asbestos claims
filed by non-residents to escape mandatory dismissal under a Texas forum
non conveniens statute. More than 8,000 plaintiffs in five related cases
pending in trial courts in Orange and Jefferson counties had brought
claims against various defendants for damages from exposure to asbestos,
adding E.I. du Pont as a defendant on September 10, 1996. In 1997, the
Texas Legislature enacted Section 71.052 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code, which provides for mandatory dismissal of asbestos-re-
lated personal injury or wrongful death claims commenced between Au-
gust 1, 1995 and January 1, 1997, if those claims arose outside the state at
a time when the plaintiff was not a resident of the state. The plaintiffs
argued, and the trial courts held, that the claims against E.I. du Pont were
not subject to dismissal under the statute because the cases (though not
the claims against E.I. du Pont) were commenced prior to August 1, 1995.
72. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 109 S.W.3d at 25.
73. Koll Real Estate Group, Inc. v. Purseley, No. 01-02-01330-CV, 2003 WL 22382623
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 16, 2003, no pet.).
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The supreme court held that to allow the claims against E.I. du Pont to
"relate back" to the date of filing of the original case would contravene
the language and defeat the intent of the statute. The supreme court also
held that E.I. du Pont would have no adequate remedy by appeal, noting
that in mass tort litigation a defendant like E.I. du Pont would have to
endure several years of litigation against other claimants before the trial
courts' decisions could be appealed. The supreme court thus condition-
ally granted E.I. du Pont's petition for mandamus.74
E. VENUE AND JOINDER
In Wyeth v. Hall, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that failing to
rule within 120 days after the appeal of a ruling on joinder is perfected
does not deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction under Section
15.003(c) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code. Hall, who al-
leged personal injuries caused by her ingestion of prescription diet drugs,
filed a petition in intervention in a case pending in Jefferson County,
Texas. The defendant drug manufacturer moved to transfer venue and
objected to the proposed intervention. Hall argued that the language of
Section 15.003(c), that the court of appeals shall "render its decision not
later than the 120th day" after the appeal is perfected, deprived the court
of jurisdiction once 120 days had passed.75 The court found that this lan-
guage was directory, not jurisdictional, and failing to rule within the pre-
scribed period would not deprive the court of jurisdiction. 76 Hall could
have properly intervened either by establishing venue independently or
by satisfying the joinder requirements of Rule 15.003. Because Hall had
not pled or offered evidence of any venue facts, the trial court's ruling
was "necessarily" and "functionally" a ruling on joinder, despite the fact
that the body of the court's order referred only to the venue motion.77
The court held that Hall had not offered proof on each of the four joinder
elements and, therefore, could not satisfy the requirements of Section
15.003.
In Smith v. Adair, the Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed a trial
court order granting permissive joinder to a group of plaintiffs who could
not independently establish venue in a county but tried to join an existing
lawsuit filed there. Three groups of plaintiffs brought suit in Harrison
County, alleging damages caused by exposure to toxic materials sold by
product suppliers. The Group A plaintiffs established venue based on
their residence in Harrison County. The Group B plaintiffs established
venue by exposure to products supplied by Harrison County businesses.
The Group C plaintiffs could not independently establish venue, but al-
leged that permissive joinder of their claims was proper because they
were exposed to toxic materials sold by the Harrison County suppliers. A
74. In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 92 S.W.3d 517 (Tex. 2002).
75. Wyeth v. Hall, 118 S.W.3d 487 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2003, no pet. h.).
76. Id. at 489.
77. Id. at 490.
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supplier argued on interlocutory appeal that the trial court erred in deny-
ing its motions to transfer venue as to Group C because the Group C
plaintiffs did not meet the requirements for permissive joinder. The
plaintiffs first argued that the appeal should be dismissed because it was
not filed within twenty days after the order was signed, as required by
Section 15.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which pro-
vides for interlocutory appeal of joinder questions. The court of appeals
explained, however, that the twenty-day period for Smith to file his ap-
peal began not when the order was signed, but when Smith received no-
tice of the order. The court then considered whether the Group C
plaintiffs met the permissive joinder requirements set out in Section
15.003, concluding that the "essential need" requirement would not be
satisfied by the mere fact that the related suits of Group A and Group B
plaintiffs were already proceeding in Harrison County.78 Finding that the
Group C plaintiffs' affidavits failed to show any "essential need" for their
claims to be tried in Harrison County, the court of appeals reversed the
order granting permissive joinder and remanded the case for trial.79
F. DISCOVERY
The Texas Supreme Court demonstrated its willingness to police over-
broad discovery of defendants in toxic tort litigation in In re CSX Corp.
The plaintiff alleged that workplace exposure to benzene and other carci-
nogenic chemicals caused him to develop refractory anemia/myelodys-
plastic syndrome. Although the plaintiff was employed only by National
Marine Services, he also sued his employer's parent corporation, Ameri-
can Commercial Barge Line, and three of its other subsidiaries. The
plaintiff served interrogatories seeking information from each defendant
regarding a thirty-year period. The first interrogatory asked for names
and addresses for all persons who worked in the industrial hygiene or
safety departments for the period of 1973 to present, the second sought
names and addresses of all safety department workers employed by the
defendants from 1970 to present, and the third asked for a list of all cor-
porate physicians employed by the defendants from 1970 to present. The
subsidiaries objected to the interrogatories as overbroad, but the trial
court ordered them to respond, and the court of appeals denied manda-
mus relief. Observing that the plaintiff had never worked for any of the
subsidiaries or for their parent company, the supreme court found that
these requests could have been more narrowly tailored to obtain informa-
tion relevant to the time period when the plaintiff was employed by Na-
tional Marine Services. Because they were not reasonably limited as to
time and subject matter, the supreme court found the three interrogato-
ries overbroad and conditionally granted mandamus relief.80
78. Smith v. Adair, 96 S.W.3d 700, 707 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. denied).
79. Id. at 707-08.
80. In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 151-52 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam).
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In In re Lincoln Electric Co., the Beaumont Court of Appeals condi-
tionally granted mandamus relief to an asbestos defendant who argued
that documents it was ordered to produce were privileged. The plaintiffs
served Lincoln a subpoena duces tecum seeking documents relating to
the manufacture, testing, expert assessment, and location of asbestos-con-
taining welding rods. Lincoln filed a motion for protective order and ob-
jected to the subpoena as overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and not
document-specific. After the trial court overruled Lincoln's objections
and ordered Lincoln to produce the requested documents, Lincoln filed a
supplemental response claiming that the information sought was privi-
leged. The court ruled that Lincoln had waived its privileges, but the
court of appeals disagreed. Emphasizing the "overall spirit of non-waiver
apparent in the applicable discovery rules," the court concluded that the
fact that Lincoln's first response consisted only of objections did not
waive its later assertion of privilege and conditionally granted Lincoln's
petition for writ of mandamus.81
G. SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEDURE
In Richard v. Reynolds Metal Co., the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
reversed summary judgment on wrongful death and survival claims
brought by an asbestos worker's widow and daughter, identifying several
procedural defects in Reynolds's two motions for summary judgment and
remanding to the trial court. In its original motion for summary judg-
ment, Reynolds claimed that asbestos did not cause the decedent's death,
raised the affirmative defenses of limitations, and asserted that the plain-
tiffs' claims were barred by the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. Be-
cause Reynolds's motion did not address distinct claims for strict liability,
premises liability, and intentional torts that were later added to plaintiffs'
petition, the court of appeals sustained the plaintiff's point of error as to
these new claims. The court also held that Reynolds's supplemental mo-
tion for summary judgment should be treated as a traditional motion
even though the introduction referred to a "no-evidence" motion because
Reynolds failed to comply with the requirements for a no-evidence mo-
tion. The court also found that Reynolds did not satisfy the traditional
summary judgment standard, even criticizing the form of Reynolds mo-
tion as "rambling" and "shotgun" because it did not clearly delineate ele-
ments on which the plaintiffs had the burden of proof and because it
addressed mixed issues including affirmative defenses and expert testi-
mony. Finally, the court rejected Reynolds's argument that the plaintiffs'
claims were barred by the decedent's release of an earlier claim against
Reynolds, explaining that, even if there was a release in the record, the
decedent's earlier claim was for sarcoidosis, not asbestosis, the basis of
81. In re Lincoln Elec. Co., 91 S.W.3d 432, 437 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, orig.
proceeding [mand. denied]).
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the current suit.8 2
IV. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
During the Survey period, the United States Supreme Court issued
opinions in several toxic tort cases that will impact Texas practitioners. In
Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Ayers, the Court ruled that railroad
workers who had developed physical injuries from exposure to asbestos
could recover damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA) for mental anguish-including their fear of contracting an asbes-
tos-related cancer-caused by the exposure. 83 The Court also rejected
the defendant's contention that it was liable only for the portion of dam-
ages caused by its tortious conduct, holding that the FELA imposes joint
and several liability on the defendant.84 In Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson,
the Court held that a tort suit against a foreign corporation may not be
removed to federal court under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) 85 unless the corporation itself-not a corporate parent or related
entity-is owned by a foreign government at the time the lawsuit is
filed.86 In Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, the Court similarly
limited federal jurisdiction, holding that a state court suit that is arguably
precluded by a federal class action judgment may not be removed to fed-
eral court under the All Writs Act.87 Finally, in Dow Chemical Co. v.
Stephenson, an equally divided court affirmed the decision of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals that a 1984 class action settlement of injury
claims relating to the use of Agent Orange during the Vietnam War did
not preclude similar claims brought by class members after the settlement
fund was exhausted, because the class members were inadequately repre-
sented in the 1984 proceedings. 88 The Stephenson decision calls into
doubt the preclusive effect of class action settlements in mass tort cases.
82. Richard v. Reynolds Metal Co., 108 S.W.3d 908, 911, 914 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2003, no pet.).
83. 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.
84. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 141 (2003).
85. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(1976).
86. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 474 (2003). See also Borja v. Dole Food
Co., Inc., No. Civ. A.3:97-CV-308-L, 2003 WL 21529297 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 2003) (holding
that removal was improper under Patrickson, 538 U.S. at 474).
87. Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 31 (2002) (interpreting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651).
88. Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (citing Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)).
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